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Abstract 
This study examines the role of board age diversity on bank performance. Using a 
sample of 97 Chinese banks, we document a negative and significant relationship 
between age diversity and bank performance. To further investigate the negative link 
between age diversity and bank performance, we decompose age diversity into personal 
value diversities. In particular, a variety of directors’ views with respect to work, 
prudence, and wealth harm bank performance. This indicates that age diversity among 
directors can affect bank performance via their values.  
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1. Introduction 
The functions of the board of directors are generally believed to include 
monitoring and controlling management, providing advice and counseling, and setting 
strategies for the company (e.g., Mace, 1971; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992; Monks and Minow, 2004). The composition of the board influences 
the way in which it performs these functions, which ultimately affects firm performance. 
Despite the strong intuitive belief for a positive role of board diversity in the corporate 
world2, the theoretical framework, which is traditionally underpinned by the resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and social psychology theories (Byrne, 1971; Williams and O’Reilly, 1996), does 
not give a clear prediction. A more diverse board matches the diversity of a company 
to the diversity of its customers and suppliers, being more creative and independent. 
However, heterogeneity could lead to more conflicts (Cox and Blake, 1991; Robinson 
and Dechant, 1997) and does not necessarily result in more effective monitoring (Cater 
et al. 2003).  
Board diversity is one of the most significant governance issues currently faced 
by modern corporations (Milliken and Martins, 1996) and has become increasingly 
                                                     
2 See for example, “Boards drive higher and more sustainable investment returns if they benefit from 
fresh perspectives, new ideas, vigorous challenge and broad experience.” -- Euan Munro, the Chief 
Executive of Aviva Investors.  
“Board diversity makes business and social sense.”  -- Lucy P. Marcus, the founder and CEO of 
Marcus Venture Consulting Ltd. 
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important to policy makers interested in good governance. Compared with other 
attributes of directors, such as gender and ethnicity3, age, a key diversity dimension, so 
far has attracted little attention in the finance literature. When profiling an individual, 
age offers more than descriptive statistics. It is a dynamic proxy of an individual’s life 
experience, indicating multifarious characteristics (Mannheim, 1949). During the life 
span, aging encompasses a wide range of factors that shape the formation of their 
personal values (Medawar, 1952; Rhodes, 1983). In a shared context marked by the 
same social and cultural environments, a cohort of individuals at similar ages is more 
likely to share commonalities in their attitudes and values (Byrne, 1971; Zenger and 
Lawrence, 1989).  
Age is also a major feature of the social context in which organizational 
members interact within groups (Ferris et al., 1991). In relation to corporate boards, 
younger directors tend to behave differently from older directors with respect to 
different values. Younger directors appear to be more energetic and have greater risk 
appetites, while older ones are likely to be more conservative with a steady personality 
(Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013). A small body of literature has shown mixed 
economic consequences of board age diversity. There is some evidence that age-diverse 
boards lead to improved firm financial performance (Ararat et al., 2010; Kim and Lim, 
2010; Mahadeo et al., 2012) by providing comprehensive resources to the board, 
                                                     
3 Increasing attention has been recognized to board diversities by gender (Erhardt et al., 2003; Huang 
and Kisgen, 2013; Liu et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016), nationality (Ruigrok et al., 2007 and García-Meca 
et al., 2015) and ethnicity (Cater et al., 2003; Cater et al., 2010). 
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enhancing the pipeline of expertise, and improving the quality of boardroom decision-
making. However, age-diverse boards are also found to harm firm social performance 
(Hafsi and Turgut, 2013), profitability (Ali et al., 2014), and strategic change (Tarus 
and Aime, 2014) due to the communication breakdown and conflicts among directors.  
Age diversity is particularly important in transition countries that have 
experienced significant economic development and political transformation over a 
relatively short period. Along with the transition of economic system, there is 
simultaneously a push toward its cultural change (Stulz and Williamson, 2003). Thus, 
people in different generations in transition countries are likely to share thoroughly 
different life experience and hold diverse values.  
During the last few decades, China has been experiencing an immense 
transformation in economy, politics, and culture. Our sample shows that a large 
proportion of directors in Chinese firms are aged from 35 to 70 and have grown up in 
Mao Zedong’s or Deng Xiaoping’s era4. Under Chairman Mao’s socialist orthodoxy, 
the Chinese government launched an initiative of collectivization, emphasizing the 
conformity to a group and discouraging individuals from standing out (Ralston et al., 
1999). Thus, generation born in Mao’s time is more likely to be less educated and is 
dedicated to a single and conventional way of doing things, sacrificing creativity. In 
                                                     
4 In 1949, Chinese Civil War ended with Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in power. Mao’s era covers 
Communist Consolidation (1949-1965) and Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), while Deng 
Xiaoping initiated Social Reform Era (1978-1992) and part of Societal Transition Era(1992-now) 
(Ralston et al., 1999; Egri and Ralston, 2004; Sun and Wang, 2010).   
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1978, Deng Xiaoping launched some modern policies which have encouraged 
individual achievement, materialism, entrepreneurship and economic efficiency (Tian, 
1998), shifting China from a planned economy to a market-based one (Egri and Ralston, 
2004). The “open-door” policy introduced western capitalistic ideology into Chinese 
business (Vohra, 2000), with rapid industrialization and modernization resulting 
unprecedented prosperity. The decision to resume China’s National College Entrance 
Test encouraged younger people to pursue higher education (Huang et al., 2016). As 
Ralston et al. (1999) and Huang et al. (2016) suggest, the generation born during Deng’s 
era is likely to be better educated, more qualified, confident, and individualistic, 
emphasizing innovation and creativity. As people grew up in each distinctive cultural 
environment, previous studies show that, in China, there are significant differences in 
values between age cohorts (Sun and Wang, 2010).  
The banking sector has been under great scrutiny since the financial crisis in 
2007. Banking holds a unique role in a nation’s economy, and poor bank governance is 
more likely to trigger bank failure, leading to serious systemic risk and negative 
externalities (Pathan, 2009; Pathan and Faff, 2013; García-Meca et al., 2015). 
Accordingly, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014) points out that the 
bank board should be composed of diverse directors to reflect its complexity and risk 
profile.  
To study the link between board age diversity and bank performance, we 
examine a sample of 97 Chinese banks over the period from 2009 to 2013. We 
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document a negative relationship between age diversity in the boardroom and bank 
performance with return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), showing that the 
costs of age diversity outweigh the benefits on bank performance in China. As age 
difference is likely to lead to variation in personal values (Egri and Ralston, 2004; Sun 
and Wang, 2010), we further decompose age diversity by value diversity. We find that 
the heterogeneity of directors’ value on work, prudence, and wealth reduce banks’ 
profitability. This negative relation indicates that age diversity could negatively affect 
bank performance via directors’ different values.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, our 
work offers a new perspective on the impact of age heterogeneity on firm performance. 
Earlier literature focuses on the direct relationship between age diversity among 
directors and organizational outcomes (Ararat et al., 2010; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Hafsi 
and Turgut, 2013; Tarus and Aime, 2014; Ali et al., 2014) or estimates the role of age 
difference between chairman and CEO (Goergen et al., 2015). Differently from them, 
we take a step further to estimate why age diversity can affect bank performance by 
introducing directors’ personal values, an unobservable dimension of heterogeneity. We 
decompose directors’ age diversity into value diversity and investigate whether the 
heterogeneity of directors’ ages could affect bank performance via their personal values. 
Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to statistically 
show age-value changes. In general, previous studies always provide propositions that 
individuals in different age cohorts “tend to” hold diverse personal values. We extract 
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eight specific personal value indicators from the World Values Survey and estimate the 
changes of these values across age cohorts. The results prove that individuals’ personal 
values with respect to risk, work, prudence, and wealth vary widely across different 
ages, while values (namely, success, thoroughness, creativity, and helping others) 
change only slightly across age cohorts. 
Thirdly, with the existing work mostly limited to non-financial firms, our work 
extends board age diversity to the banking sector. Facing greater liquidity problems 
with high leverage and severe information asymmetry, directors in banks are different 
from non-bank directors as they are accountable to not only shareholders but also 
depositors and regulators (Levine, 2004; García-Meca et al., 2015). This requires the 
boards to be equipped with more specialized skills and wider knowledge (Nguyen et 
al., 2015). Having the right board composition is crucial for the success of a bank.  
Lastly, we provide the first empirical study on board age (value) diversity and 
bank performance in China. The existing literature on China mainly concentrates on 
gender diversity (Liu et al., 2014; Cumming et al., 2015). Regarding the Chinese 
banking sector, existing studies mainly focus on ownership structure rather than board 
characteristics. The only work related to bank board characteristics is Liang et al. (2013) 
who find that independent directors are beneficial to bank performance, while political-
connected directors are negatively associated with bank profitability.  
We believe that findings from this study are not only relevant for China but also 
for other transition countries. Due to the immense transition in the economic and 
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cultural systems, directors from different generations are more likely to hold 
heterogeneous values. Hence, there is a growing need to manage the generational gaps 
between directors and have a better understanding of optimal board composition that 
can influence firm performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a critical review 
of literature on board age diversity and firm performance. Section 3 describes the data 
collection and methodology. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 
5 provides the summary and the conclusion. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 Board age diversity and performance 
Grounded in resource dependency theory, the board is regarded as the provider 
of advice and counsel, legitimacy, and communication channels (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). A diverse board can enhance the firm’s performance by providing 
comprehensive and valuable resources to the board, improving information quality and 
creating a balanced board (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Carter et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, a more age-diverse board facilitates the bank to meet the need of different 
customers and penetrate deep into the market (Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013). 
 Based on agency theory, the board of directors is an important internal 
mechanism to mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Board diversity can enhance firm’s performance by increasing board 
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independence as diversity can bring more ultimate outsiders into boards and enhance 
mutual monitoring (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Cater et al., 
2003). However, some studies such as Carter et al. (2003) argue that board diversity 
may not lead to more effective monitoring since diverse board members may be 
marginalized.  
Empirically, Ararat et al. (2010) find that a diversified representation of 
different generations in boards enhances the flexibility of the decision-making by 
balancing risks and ultimately leads to better firm performance in Turkey. Kim and Lim 
(2010) prove that age diversity in independent directors can increase firms’ values due 
to directors’ comprehensive human capital. Mahadeo et al. (2012) also suggest that a 
mixed-age board is beneficial to firm performance in Mauritius.  
By contrast, board age diversity may come at a cost and hamper firms’ 
performance. On the basis of the “similarity-attraction paradigm” (i.e., the similarity in 
directors’ attributes facilitates group thinking), individuals perceive other people who 
are demographically different from them as “outsiders” who are holding different 
values. They tend to be reluctant to share information with “outside” individuals and 
providing thoroughly different opinions, leading to interpersonal attraction breakdown 
(Adams et al., 2010; Estélyi and Nisar, 2016). When it comes to the boards, different 
perspectives and cognitive abilities in the board may generate conflicts among different 
groups of directors (Byrne, 1971; Williams and O’Reilly 1996). Such conflicts are 
likely to hinder the development of boardroom cohesiveness, produce barriers for 
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communication, protract decision-making processes, and weaken firm performance 
(Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Wang and Hsu, 2013).  
Tarus and Aime (2014) provide evidence that age diversity on the board 
negatively affects corporate strategic change since the old and the young have conflicts 
in decision-making. Ali et al. (2014) show that the level of board age diversity falls 
with the increase in firm profitability, which supports the argument of Hafsi and Turgut 
(2013) that age diversity in the boardroom negatively affects corporate social 
performance. Therefore, the above discussions suggest that board age diversity is a 
“double-edged-sword”.  
2.2 Age and personal values  
As a demographic attribute, age is different from gender, ethnicity, and other 
facets that make each of us unique as individuals. An individual’s age conveys 
information about his preference and lifestyle as culture is transmitted across 
generations. During the life span, ageing effects involve a wide range of factors 
influencing the development of personal values, such as risk-taking behavior, decision-
making, and attitudes to work (Medawar, 1952; Child, 1974; Rhodes, 1983; Ferris et 
al., 1991; Sun and Wang, 2010; Serfling, 2014).  
At the group level, individuals of similar age prefer to interact with those whom 
they perceive to be similar to them. This can be explained by the “similarity-attraction 
paradigm”, where individuals born at similar times are more likely to develop similar 
views on their life experience since they are similarly minded. Such similarity may in 
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turn foster interpersonal attraction, group thinking, and cooperation (Byrne, 1971; 
Zenger and Lawrence, 1989; Kunze et al., 2011; Goergen et al., 2015). 
In the psychology literature, the socialization hypothesis proposes that the 
values of each generation change in accordance with the prevailing condition during 
their formative years (Inglehart, 2008). Rokeach (1973, p.25) argues that “personal 
value is an enduring prescriptive and proscriptive belief that a specific mode of 
behavior is preferred to an opposite mode behavior – this belief transcends attitudes 
towards objects and situations”. It has been a tradition to explore the value changes 
between generations since age difference is likely to lead to variation in personal values 
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Egri and Ralston, 2004; Sun and Wang, 2010). In turn, the 
difference in values can also cause a generation gap between young and old (Prasad, 
1992). Thus, age might be one of the predictors of value. Furthermore, previous studies 
generally agree that individuals’ values are entrenched since their late-teens (Ralston et 
al., 1999). Consistent with this, Ghitza and Gelman (2014) find that social events 
between the ages of 18 to 24 are far more influential than those that occur at an older 
age.  
2.3 Board value diversity and performance 
Personal values are vital to management decisions and corporate actions 
(Marcus et al., 2015). Certain values such as creativity, loyalty, hard work and sense of 
responsibility are desirable for the board.  
Some studies suggest that there are significant value differences among 
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executives across age cohorts. Younger executives appear to be more creative with 
greater risk appetite and are able to bring better cognitive resources to decision-making 
tasks (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Mishra and Jhunjhunwala, 2013). Young managers 
are found to have a higher probability to challenge the existing system of company rules 
and make risky decisions (Child, 1974; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Cheng et al., 2010) 
to signal to the market that they possess superior abilities (Prendergast and Stole, 1996). 
Older executives tend to be more cautious and conservative (Bantel and Jackson, 1989), 
more capable in dealing with external agencies such as regulators and authorities 
(Grove et al. 2011).  
Assessing values and the value difference across different generations 
constitutes a basic approach to understand the generational gap. So far, no study has 
examined why age-diverse boards influence performance. We decompose directors’ age 
into their personal values and argue that board age diversity may affect bank 
performance via directors’ value diversity.  In the absence of empirical evidence on 
directors’ personal values and firm performance, Jehn et al. (1999) provide some 
theoretical explanations that personal value diversity in the workforce leads to conflicts 
as the dissimilarity protracts the interaction in the group. In our study, we expect that 
directors’ diverse values affect bank performance via their different values.  
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
We build a sample with information on directors’ characteristics, ownership 
structure, and financial statements for 97 Chinese banks during the period 2009-2013. 
We start with the universe of 190 Chinese banks available on Bankscope. We focus on 
commercial banks, cooperative banks, and savings banks. To allow hand-collection of 
data on the board and ownership structure, we exclude banks that fail to have at least 
one annual report during the study period. Finally, we focus on banks that disclose 
directors’ demographic characteristics, especially age, in their annual reports. The 
filtering procedure results in a final sample of 97 banks, which represent about three 
quarters of the total assets of Chinese banking institutions at the end of 2013 (China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, 2014).  
Bank-specific financial information is mainly extracted from Bankscope. We 
replace the missing values and questionable values in Bankscope by hand-collected 
data from each individual bank’s annual report. Most of the banks in our sample follow 
the local GAAP Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS), while the listed commercial 
banks5 employ the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The CAS was 
developed recently following the principle of IFRS, and there is no material difference 
between the financial statements of the same bank under IFRS and CAS (Berger et al., 
                                                     
5 18 Chinese banks in our sample are listed. 
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2009; Liang et al., 2013). Additionally, the data for the economic indicator (i.e., GDP 
per capita) are extracted from China City Statistical Yearbook published by China 
Statistics Press. 
To predict directors’ values, we employ the World Values Survey Sixth Wave, a 
cross-country project containing information about demographics (age, gender, and 
education), self-reported economic information (income and social class), and answers 
to specific questions on fifteen categories of values on the economy, work ethics, 
religions, democracy, and other attitudes. The China Survey was conducted in 2012 and 
measures values and attitudes held by Chinese citizens. The respondents are aged from 
18 to 75 and they reside in all provinces of China. We employ World Values Survey
 China (2012)6 to predict the values of Chinese directors.  
Among the 6,195 directors who served on the board of sample banks, we have 
177 (around 2%) foreign directors from 13 other countries/regions. To predict foreign 
directors’ values, we also download the respective 13 foreign countries/regions’ World 
Values Surveys, including the United Kingdom, the United States, the Switzerland, 
Spain, the Netherlands, Taiwan, Singapore, Germany, Australia, France, Hong Kong, 
and Italy. From the World Value Survey, we extract work-related value indicators.  
                                                     
6 The World Values Survey has six waves, each wave with five-year period. In each wave, there is only 
one survey for one country. In our study, we employ the latest wave of China - China Survey (2012) 
which covers most of the period (2009-2013) in our sample. 
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3.2 Model specifications and descriptive statistics 
To examine the impacts of board age diversity on bank performance, we employ 
the following main model (1) specified: 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝜃𝑡   + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                          (1) 
Where 𝑖 is the bank identifier and t is the year. The key coefficient of interest 𝛽 
captures the impact of board age diversity on bank performance. 𝜇 is an individual-
specific effect, which varies across banks, and 𝜀 denotes to the error term, which varies 
both among banks and periods of time. Model (1) is estimated by a fixed-effects 
estimator, which is justified using the Hausman Test. The reported standard errors are 
adjusted for potential heteroscedasticity.  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is measured by both profitability and risks. As for bank 
profitability, return on assets (ROA) is net income over total assets, which shows how 
efficiently the bank produces profit by the given assets. Return on equity (ROE) is 
calculated as net income divided by total equity, assessing the return on shareholders’ 
investment. In terms of risk, the Z-score, defined as return on assets plus the equity to 
assets ratio divided by the standard deviation of return on assets, is the inverse of the 
probability that bank losses surmount bank capital7 and measures the distance to default 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009; Dong et al., 2014). Thus, a higher Z-score indicates lower 
                                                     
7 That is probability (–ROA < E/A), where E/A is the capital to assets ratio (equity/assets). 
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risk in the bank. Since Z-scores are highly skewed, we take the natural log of the Z-
score (Z-score) in further analysis. We also use non-performing loan ratio (NPLratio), 
calculated as non-performing loans to total loans, as an alternative risk measure. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the bank performance 
measures. During the sample period, the average ROA and ROE are 0.01 and 0.19, 
which is comparable to 0.01 and 0.14 given in Liang et al. (2013) who study a sample 
of 52 Chinese banks during the period from 2003 to 2010. The average Z-score value 
is 3.87. On average, NPLratio is 0.01, which is smaller compared to 0.0262 given in 
Dong et al. (2014) for a sample of Chinese commercial banks during 2003-2011. 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 is measured by the coefficient of variation of age (CV) 
calculated by the ratio of the standard deviation of board age to mean of board age.8  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
Figure 1 and Panel B of Table 1 show substantial board age diversity in Chinese 
banks. The average age of board directors in Chinese banks is 51.95, and the standard 
deviation is high at 7.99. The youngest is 29 years old, while the oldest is 83. The 
average coefficient of variation of board age (CV) is 0.14. The majority of directors on 
Chinese boards appear to be in their forties (39%) and fifties (39%).  
                                                     
8 Alternative measures of age diversity are the Blau Index (Blau) and standard deviation of board age 
(SD). These three measures (CV, Blau and SD) are significantly correlated at 0.7 or above. 
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𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠  includes four categories. First, three variables on board 
characteristics include the natural logarithm of board size (Board Size), which is found 
to have a significant effect on bank performance (Staikouras et al., 2007; Adams and 
Mehran, 2012), the percentage of independent directors (Independent Director) who 
may have strong incentives to scrutinize the management (Erkens et al., 2012; Adam 
and Mehran, 2012), and a dummy variable (Duality), which equals one if the chief 
executive officer (CEO) is also the chairman.  
Second, the ownership variables control for both the type and level of the 
ownership structure (Liang et al., 2013). We include the proportion of shares owned by 
the largest shareholder if the largest shareholder is the government or state-owned 
enterprises (State), a foreign investor (Foreign), and a private investor (Private).  
Some additional variables to capture bank-specific characteristics (Berger et al., 
2009; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Liang et al., 2013; Dong et al., 2014; García-Meca et al., 
2015) are also included. Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Size). The capital ratio is measured as total equity to total assets (Capital Ratio), 
reflecting the bank capitalization. We also calculate the loan ratio by total loans to total 
assets (Loan Ratio), which is related to the banks’ credit. A dummy variable for listed 
banks (Listed) equals one if the bank is listed. We also include the natural logarithm of 
the number of years since the bank has been established (Bank Age) as banks with a 
long history tend to have a more mature operation system that is related to better 
performance.  
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Lastly, to account for the potential regional effects on bank performance, we 
follow previous studies (Ferri, 2009; Zhang et al., 2012; Qian et al., 2015) and employ 
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita for the city (City GDP) where the bank’s 
headquarters are located. To control for macroeconomic shocks, all of our regressions 
contain a full set of year dummies. 
Panel D of Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the control variables. The 
average board size in Chinese banks is 13.77, which is comparable to that of 12.68 in 
the US (Pathan and Faff, 2013) and 12.79 in nine developed countries9 (García-Meca 
et al., 2015). On average, 25% of directors in Chinese banks are independent directors. 
In our sample, only 3% of CEOs in Chinese banks have the duality position. In the 
ongoing process of privatization, only about 18% (18) of the sample banks are listed on 
the stock exchange. On average, in our sample, around 24% of shares are owned by the 
largest shareholder if the largest shareholder is the government or state-owned 
enterprise. 
In order to explore the reasons why board age diversity affects bank 
performance, we introduce directors’ personal values. As discussed before, directors’ 
values are not directly observable but are assumed to be framed by their ages. To obtain 
the impact of value diversity on bank performance, we take three steps. In the first stage, 
we extract 17 value indicators which are related with work and business from China 
                                                     
9 Nine developed countries include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
the UK and the US. 
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Values Survey (2012), namely, risk, work, happiness, prudence, wealth, success, 
thoroughness, pressure, outgoing, active, creativity, helping others, finding faults, 
reserved, life satisfaction, slackness, tension10 . Then we apply a logit model (2) to 
predict the parameters based on China Values Survey (2012). To create the dependent 
variable, following Ahern et al. (2015), we rescale the responses to each question (each 
value indicator) into a binary variable, taking values of zero or one (See Appendix A). 
For example, for a value on risk taking, we assess whether taking risk is important to 
the person by scaling answers “Very Important” and “Rather Important” as one and 
“Not very important” and “Not at all important” as zero.   
The following logit model is used to predict each director’s values: 
Pr(𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 1)  = 𝐹 (𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗  +𝛽2𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗  + 𝛽3𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑗   + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗   +  𝛽5𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑗 
+𝛽6𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑗  + 𝛽7𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +𝜀)                                                            (2)      
𝐹 is the cumulative standard logistic distribution.  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗 equals one if the 
respondent 𝑗 ’s response to the question (value indicator  𝑗 )  is recorded as one.  𝜀 
denotes the random error, and the values are all measured by the probability of holding 
this value. Independent variables in Model (2) include available key demographic and 
socio-economic variables taken from the background information provided in the 
                                                     
10 World Values Survey measures support for democracy tolerance of foreigners and ethnic minorities, 
support for gender equality, the role of religion and changing levels of religiosity, the impact of 
globalization, attitudes toward the environment, work, family, politics, national identity, culture, 
diversity, insecurity, and subjective well-being. In the China Values Survey (2012), we try our best to 
identify all the available value indicators that are related with work/business. 
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survey. Age is given in years. Except for Age, Education, Income and Social Class are 
specified as categorical variables. Education is divided into three groups: university 
(university or higher), second school (specialized secondary or vocational technical 
school), and primary school (primary school or less). Income is consolidated from nine 
into three categories: high, middle, and low. Social Class is assessed in four categories: 
lower class, working class, middle class, and upper class. Gender is indicated with a 
zero for female and a one for male. Supervisory Status equals one if he/she is 
supervising other people at work and 0 otherwise. Employment is denoted as one for 
those in employment and zero otherwise. After we estimate parameters for each value 
indicator, we can identify the value indicators that are significantly affected by age 
shown by 𝛽1  in model (2) and keep them for later analysis. After this step, we keep 
only eight out of seventeen value indicators, namely, risk, work, prudence, wealth, 
success, thoroughness, creativity, and helping others (see Panel B of Appendix B). 
In the second stage, we predict directors’ personal values on these eight value 
indicators in our sample, inputting directors’ information including age, education level, 
gender, income level, social class, and supervisory status into model (2) using the 
parameters predicted in the first step. Apart from age, education level, gender and 
supervisory status, we assume that all the bank directors in our sample have the same 
income level11, and the same social class. Since some foreign directors have stayed in 
                                                     
11 In the World Values Survey, individuals’ income level is scaled across nine levels (1-9). We rescale 
them into three categories: low (1-3), middle (4-6) and high (7-9).  In our study, we assume all 
directors are in the high-income level. 
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China for a long time, they are likely to be influenced by Chinese culture and lifestyle. 
These foreign directors’ values are affected not only by their own country but also by 
China. Thus, we calculate foreign directors’ values based on the China survey and their 
own country survey with equal weights. 
In the third stage, we employ the following model, which is similar to model 
(1), to examine the impacts of these value diversities on bank performance:  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  = α + 𝛽 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛾 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  + 
𝜃𝑡   + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                              (3) 
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒_𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 includes eight value diversities which are calculated by 
the coefficient of variation of each value indicator, respectively. From Panel C of Table 
1, we find that values on risk, work, prudence, and wealth have higher coefficients of 
variation (0.11, 0.06, 0.06, 0.07, respectively) compared with the rest of the value 
indicators. Furthermore, after the estimation, if the 𝛽 in model (3) is in the same sign 
(positive or negative) as 𝛽 in model (1), we can conclude that age is one of the strongest 
predictors of value, and age diversity can affect bank performance via directors’ values. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Does age diversity affect bank performance? 
We first examine whether the age diversity affects bank performance. Table 2 
shows the results of model (1) with bank profitability and bank risk presented in 
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columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), respectively. Age diversity has a significant and negative 
impact on bank profitability. Specifically, a two standard deviation increase in age 
diversity (CV) shrinks ROA by 10.4% and ROE by 9.68%, which is comparable with a 
strand of existing literature in non-bank samples (Murray, 1989; Ali et al., 2014; Tarus 
and Aime, 2014).  
This result is in line with the argument that age diversity lessens the cohesion 
in the boardroom, leads to barriers such as difficult communication, and generates 
conflicts (Williams and O’Reilly 1996; Pelled et al., 1999; Westphal and Bednar, 2005). 
Such conflicts can protract the decision-making process and weaken the effectiveness 
of the board. When the effects of conflicts in board communication, cooperation, and 
decision-making processes outweigh the benefits of providing comprehensive 
perspectives and different external information by directors at different ages, the role 
of the board as a monitor and advisor will be impeded. As a result, an insufficient board 
may subsequently weaken the bank’s profitability. However, in terms of risk 
performance, we do not find any significant relationship between age diversity and 
bank risk.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
With respect to other board characteristics, Duality has a significantly negative 
relationship with ROA (significance at the 10% level) and a strong positive impact on 
NPLratio (significance at the 1% level), which indicates that banks with CEO duality 
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position perform worse. In terms of board independence, the coefficient of Independent 
Directors is significantly positive on bank profitability and negative on bank credit risk, 
which is consistent with previous studies (Liang et al., 2013; García-Meca et al., 2015). 
This relationship suggests that independent directors are beneficial to Chinese banks. 
With regard to other bank characteristics, Private ownership harms bank performance 
measured by ROA, while the larger Bank Size weakens bank performance by decreasing 
ROE and augmenting non-performing loans. We also find that bank Capital Ratio is 
negatively related with ROE and positively related with Z-score (at the significance 
level of 1% and 5%, respectively), indicating that banks with a higher degree of 
capitalization have lower insolvency risk. 
4.2 Age and values 
Generational gaps are often caused by differences in values (Prasad, 1992). It 
appears that there is no consensus about how to define generations in China. Studies 
generally reach an agreement each generation comes into existence with a particular 
social movement with a shared experience (Sun and Wang, 2010) and that most of an 
individual’s values become entrenched in one’s late-teens (Ralston et al., 1999). Based 
on this framework of value formation, in our work, we define our generation as two 
main groups that correspond to specific social and political events at the age of 18: 
Mao’s generation (born during 1931-1958) and Deng’s generation (born during 1959-
1990) (See Figure 2). According to some specific social events, we further divide Mao 
generation into Early Mao generation (born during 1931-1947) who experienced 
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Communist Consolidation period and late Mao generation (born during 1948-1958) 
who underwent Great Cultural Revolution. Similarly, we decompose Deng generation 
into Early Deng generation (born during 1959-1974) who experienced Social Economic 
Reform and Late Deng generation (born during 1975-1990) who are in the societal 
transition period. (Ralston et al., 1999; Egri and Ralston, 2004; Sun and Wang, 2010) 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
Our value analysis first focuses on 17 values based on the World Values Survey. 
Table 3 shows the predicted parameters of different values. Coefficients of eight values 
are significantly affected by age, including risk, work, prudence, wealth, success, 
thoroughness, creativity, and helping others.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
Figure 3 shows the changes of eight personal values (average probability of 
holding this value) in the different generations of directors in our sample. In Panel A, 
directors from the late Deng generation are shown to have greater risk appetite than 
directors in from the early Mao generation. Regarding the value on creativity in Panel 
G, directors growing up in Deng’s era are more creative and come up with new ideas, 
whereas the ones who grew up in Mao’s era are more coherent in a conventional process 
and work out the solution in a single and conventional way, which is consistent with 
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views by Ralston et al. (1999) and Sun and Wang (2010).  
Panel B of Figure 3 shows that Deng’s generation values work more than the 
other generations and devotes great passion into their work. Additionally, the late Deng 
generation appreciates wealth more, pursing profit maximization (see Panel D of Figure 
3). Consistent with previous studies (Sun and Wang, 2010), younger directors enjoy the 
feeling of being successful and yearn for achievement recognition.  
In terms of work ethics, to behave properly is essential for older directors. Panel 
C of figure 3 shows that they are more prudent and cautious than the younger ones. 
Furthermore, Panel F shows that directors who are from the early Mao generation insist 
on doing a job more thoroughly than the younger ones. However, the massive shifts in 
China also pose slight impacts on some dimensions of directors’ values. For example, 
there is a relatively small difference in directors’ attitudes to help others nearby across 
age cohorts, as shown in Panel H.  
4.3 Why does age diversity affect bank performance? 
In order to further investigate the negative relationship between age diversity 
and bank performance, we decompose age diversity into value diversity and test 
whether diversity in different values influences bank performance. Similar to age 
diversity, the results presented in Table 4 show that the heterogeneity of directors’ views 
in some cases poses a negative impact on bank performance. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
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The coefficients of directors’ diverse views on work, prudence, and wealth 
impose negative impacts on banks’ profitability 12 . An increase of two standard 
deviations in value diversity on work is associated with a decrease in ROA of 10.4% 
and in ROE of 11.92%. With regard to prudence, increases of two standard deviations 
exert negative impacts on ROA and ROE of 12% and 14.74%, respectively. Furthermore, 
increases of two standard deviations in directors’ value diversity of wealth reduce banks’ 
ROA by 30.4% and ROE by 34.74%. Additionally, we can observe that the coefficients 
of directors’ diverse values on creativity and helping others affect ROE negatively at 
the 10% level. These results are consistent with Jehn et al. (1999) who argue that value 
diversity can trigger intragroup conflicts in the workforce and cause a negative impact 
on group performance. 
As shown in Figure 3, directors’ values on work, prudence, wealth, and 
creativity change across the different generations. Directors growing up in Deng’s era 
are more creative, devote greater passion to their work, and pursue profit maximization. 
However, directors growing up in Mao’s era are more cautious, they value work less, 
and they are more coordinated. Taken together, these differences in personal values 
across generations are more likely to weaken the interpersonal relations between groups 
but may spark intragroup conflicts in decision-making. This conflict hampers the board 
                                                     
12 As the directors’ values are imputed, we employ a bootstrap approach to check the robustness of the 
results reported in Table 4. The idea here is to resample the residuals with replacement a specified 
number of times. Appendix C5 resamples the residuals using 1,000 replications and shows similar 
parameters and standard errors with those in Table 4. 
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from functioning effectively, which ultimately reduces bank performance.  
With respect to bank risk, Panel D in Table 4 illustrates that directors’ diverse 
values on risk are positively associated with NPLratio (at the 10% level), indicating 
that the variability of views on risks increases bank credit risk.  
In summary, taking together the results shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4, the effect 
of value diversity has the same sign with that of age diversity on bank performance. 
Thus, we can conclude that age diversity may affect bank performance negatively via 
their diverse values with respect to work, prudence, and wealth. Put differently, 
directors in different age cohorts hold diverse personal values in work, prudence, and 
wealth (creativity and helping others) and approach decisions and policies differently. 
Consequently, it is more likely to create conflicts, hamper the board from effective 
functioning, and lead to worse bank performance.  
4.4 Robustness  
4.4.1 Potential endogeneity concern 
A key concern for analysis of board effects on firm performance is the 
endogeneity. In our main model, we partially address this issue by employing one-year 
lagged board characteristics since board structure needs time to affect bank 
performance. In board composition research, dynamic endogeneity is also a major issue. 
Wintoki et al. (2012) argue that most of the exiting literatures on board structure 
neglects the fact that current board structure might be the realization of past firm 
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performance. Current firm performance may affect future board composition, and these, 
in turn, may affect future firm performance. In our study, shareholders may call for 
changes to the board. Replacing a younger director with an older individual could 
change the age distribution on the board and, ultimately, affect bank performance. Thus, 
previous bank performance can affect the motivation of boards to hire new directors.  
As a possible solution, our empirical analysis is extended to employ the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, 
which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity as well as dynamic relation between 
board structure and past firm performance (Wintoki et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014). We 
report the GMM regressions in Appendix C1. All the independent variables are assumed 
to be endogenous variables, except Bank Age and the year dummies. The lags (t-2, t-3, 
and t-4) of the dependent variable and endogenous variables, together with all the lags 
of the exogenous variables, are instrument variables. In Appendix C1, we still find a 
significant negative effect (at 10% level) of board age diversity on bank profitability. 
Therefore, our main results in model (1) are robust and are not driven by endogeneity.  
4.4.2 Additional robustness tests 
In examining the relationship between age diversity and bank performance in 
model (1), we use the standard deviation of board age (SV) and Blau index of board age 
(Blau) as alternative measures of age diversity. We find a consistently negative relation 
between age diversity and bank profitability (shown in Appendix C2 and C3). Further, 
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we employ an alternative measure to calculate foreign directors’ values only based on 
their own country survey as a robust check in Appendix C4. Consistent with Table 4, 
we also find negative relations between directors’ value diversities on work, prudence, 
and helping others at one side and bank profitability at the other side.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper extends the existing literature on board diversity by providing the 
first empirical evidence of the effect of board age diversity on bank performance in 
China. Our results show that age diversity in Chinese banks has a significant and 
negative influence on bank performance. Although previous studies based on resource 
dependency theory argue that a more diverse board provides more valuable information 
and enhances firm performance, this study suggests that this type of age diversity is not 
beneficial to Chinese banks. That is, age-diverse boards are more likely to suffer from 
communication barriers and generate interpersonal frictions and conflicts in the 
boardroom, and ultimately reduce bank performance. 
 To examine why age diversity negatively affects bank performance, we further 
decompose directors’ age diversity into their personal value diversity. Given the 
immense transition in China over the past decades, Chinese directors growing up in 
Mao’s and Deng’s eras experienced different historical events and cultural phenomena, 
which in turn affected their formulation of values and cognitive abilities. We find that 
the heterogeneity of directors’ views with respect to work, prudence, and wealth 
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negatively affects bank profitability. This negative relation confirms that directors’ age 
diversity affect bank performance via directors’ diverse values, as age is one of the 
strongest predictors of value. Put differently, directors with diverse values on work, 
prudence, approach decisions differently (i.e., they are more likely to slow down the 
decision process in the boardroom and make it more conflicts), leading to worse bank 
performance. In this way, we conclude that the ultimate success of the board depends 
not only directors’ resources but also the interactions between them.  
Our findings provide useful guidance for regulators, policymakers, and bank 
directors concerning board diversity and shed light on the direction of further banking 
governance reform. In particular, our findings suggest that, in the current weak 
corporate governance system in China, an age-diverse board is not beneficial to the 
bank. Banks with weak governance should look into adding directors with similar ages 
into their board, to lower the generation gap in the board.  
We believe that findings from this study are relevant not only for China but also 
for other transition countries that are transforming from a centrally planned economy 
to a market-based economy. For these countries, directors from different generations 
are more likely to hold heterogeneous values, as cultural change is an ingredient of 
economic development. To strive for excellence, the board should appreciate the 
diverse personal values among directors, learn to manage value differences, and utilize 
the benefits of directors’ different personal values to improve the effectiveness of the 
board. Managing the difference among directors is likely to lead to a better 
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understanding of optimal board composition. 
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Figure 1 Distribution of Directors’ Age in Chinese Banks from 2009- 2013 
 
Source: Chinese bank annual report (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013) 
Notes: This figure reports the age distribution of all the directors on the board. Age is 
on the horizontal axis. 
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Figure 2 Chinese Generation Timeline 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the generation timeline in China. Mao’s era covers the Communist Consolidation (1949-1965) and Great Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), while Deng Xiaoping initiated the Social Reform Era (1978-1992) and part of Societal Transition Era(1993-now) (Ralston 
et al., 1999; Egri and Ralston, 2004; Sun and Wang, 2010).  Since social events at the age of 18 is far more influential than those that occur at an 
older age (Ghitza and Gelman, 2014), we divided different sub-generations based on this age (18). 
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Figure 3 Personal Value Differences of Directors in the Sample (Chinese Banks: 2009 
– 2013) 
 
Source: Chinese bank annual report (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013), World Values Survey 6th Wave 
Notes: Panels A to H show directors’ personal value (mean) changes across different age groups, 
namely, risk, work, prudence, wealth, success, thoroughness, creativity, and helping others. We 
define our generation groups that correspond to specific social and political events at the age 
of 18: Early Mao generation (born during 1931-1947)，late Mao generation (born during 1948-
1958)，Early Deng generation (born during 1959-1974) and Late Deng generation (born 
during 1975-1990). Generation groups are on the horizontal axis. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std P25 P50 P75 Obs 
Panel A: Bank Performance 
ROA 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 448 
ROE 0.19 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.22 448 
Z-score 3.87 0.71 3.39 3.80 4.31 441 
NPLratio 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 435 
Panel B: Bank Board Age Diversity 
Age diversity (CV) 0.14 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.17 450 
Age diversity (SD) 7.24 1.96 6.03 6.96 8.61 450 
Age diversity (Blau) 0.58 0.11 0.52 0.60 0.65 450 
Panel C: Bank Board Value Diversity 
Value diversity (risk) 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.13 302 
Value diversity (work) 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07 302 
Value diversity (prudence) 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07 302 
Value diversity (wealth) 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 302 
Value diversity (success) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 302 
Value diversity 
(thoroughness) 
0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 302 
Value diversity (creativity) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 302 
Value diversity (helping 
others) 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 302 
Panel D: Control Variables 
Board Characteristics       
Independent Director 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.27 0.33 450 
Board Size 13.77 3.37 11.00 14.00 15.00 450 
Duality 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 439 
Ownership characteristics       
State 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.21 451 
Foreign 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 451 
Private 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 451 
Bank-Specific measures       
Capital Ratio 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 444 
Loan Ratio 0.46 0.11 0.40 0.48 0.54 446 
Size 18.83 1.65 17.70 18.44 19.56 446 
Bank Age             2.40 0.88 1.95 2.56 2.77 442 
Listed 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 451 
Location effects       
City GDP 10.98 0.49 10.63 11.07 11.38 454 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics on key variables. The sample is an unbalanced panel 
covering 97 banks over the period of 2009 -2013. Panel A reports the summary statistics of bank 
performance variables. Panel B reports the summary statistics of Bank Board Age Diversity variables. 
Panel C reports the summary statistics of board value diversity variables. Panel D reports the 
summary statistics of other control variables.   
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Table 2 
Relation between board age diversity and bank performance 
 Profitability    Risk   
                          ROA     ROE     Z-score  NPLratio    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
                                 
Age Diversity  -0.013**  -0.230*  -0.026  0.025 
                          (-2.021)  (-1.922)  (-0.055)  (0.715) 
Board Size 0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.000 
                          (1.307)  (0.657)  (-0.195)  (0.142) 
Duality                 -0.002*  -0.024  0.086  0.005*** 
                          (-1.810)  (-1.317)  (0.950)  (2.867) 
Independent Director 0.005*  0.055  0.247  -0.025** 
                          (1.691)  (1.019)  (1.562)  (-2.278) 
State 0.008  0.186  0.095  -0.038 
                          (1.382)  (1.629)  (0.290)  (-0.958) 
Foreign 0.001  0.224  -0.348  0.004 
                          (0.144)  (1.406)  (-0.897)  (0.111) 
Private -0.008*  -0.065  0.029  0.044 
                          (-1.739)  (-0.757)  (0.111)  (1.530) 
Size -0.002  -0.051**  -0.078  0.018* 
                          (-1.366)  (-2.039)  (-0.923)  (1.754) 
Listed                  0.001  0.016  -0.022  0.000 
                          (1.091)  (1.037)  (-0.414)  (0.029) 
Loan Ratio -0.005  -0.085  -0.274  0.035 
                          (-1.363)  (-1.202)  (-0.990)  (1.359) 
Capital Ratio                0.014  -0.998***  1.444**  -0.014 
                          (0.961)  (-4.003)  (2.028)  (-0.300) 
City GDP -0.001  -0.023  0.008  -0.000 
                          (-0.899)  (-0.843)  (0.095)  (-0.044) 
Bank Age             0.000  0.010  0.044  0.009* 
                          (0.084)  (0.472)  (0.749)  (1.751) 
Year Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Obs 325  325  325  322 
𝑅2                       0.224  0.204  0.154  0.207 
Notes: The table presents the results of the effects of age diversity on bank performance in model (1). The 
dependent variables are bank profitability and risks. The left panel presents results of bank profitability 
measured by ROA and ROE in columns (1) and (2). The right panel presents of bank risk measured by Z-
score and NPLratio in columns (3) and (4). Age Diversity is measured by coefficient of variation of board 
age (CV). Board Size is the natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality is equal to 1 if the bank 
governor is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Independent Director is the percentage of 
independent directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the largest 
shareholder is government or state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholders if the largest shareholder is a private investor. Size is the natural log of total assets. 
Bank Age is the natural log of bank age. The dummy Listed equals 1 if the bank has been listed at the end 
of the year and 0 otherwise. City GDP is the natural log of GDP per capita of the city in which the bank’s 
headquarters is located. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent variables. The 
robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance 
level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3a 
Regression of prediction of values (China)  
                  Value 
(risk) 
Value 
(work) 
Value 
(happiness) 
Value 
(prudence) 
Value 
(wealth) 
Value 
(success) 
Value 
(thoroughness) 
Value 
(pressure) 
Value 
(outgoing) 
Age -0.046*** -0.051*** 0.000 0.030*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 0.020*** 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Education          
2(secondary school) -0.304* -0.042 0.245 -0.059 -0.439** 0.187 0.378* 0.258 0.269 
 (0.172) (0.214) (0.207) (0.218) (0.194) (0.213) (0.194) (0.180) (0.177) 
3(university) -0.067 -0.018 0.342 -0.177 -0.222 0.700** 0.692*** -0.172 -0.099 
 (0.223) (0.318) (0.311) (0.261) (0.259) (0.337) (0.266) (0.231) (0.229) 
Employment 0.275 0.833*** 0.059 0.410* 0.707*** 0.477** 0.149 -0.101 -0.035 
 (0.179) (0.215) (0.238) (0.213) (0.195) (0.229) (0.206) (0.186) (0.185) 
income          
2(middle) 0.053 0.094 0.028 -0.404* 0.427** 0.112 -0.020 0.261 0.234 
 (0.162) (0.254) (0.203) (0.233) (0.189) (0.231) (0.182) (0.168) (0.165) 
3 (high) 0.479** 0.608* 0.396 -0.960*** 0.435 -0.027 0.027 0.599** 0.178 
 (0.232) (0.367) (0.380) (0.297) (0.269) (0.356) (0.283) (0.255) (0.243) 
gender 0.323** 0.241 -0.275 -0.121 0.054 0.251 0.225 0.140 0.257* 
 (0.130) (0.185) (0.179) (0.158) (0.152) (0.186) (0.149) (0.135) (0.133) 
Social class          
2 (working) -0.368** 0.280 -0.481** 0.130 -0.343* -0.339 -0.323* -0.349** -0.200 
 (0.155) (0.237) (0.210) (0.194) (0.185) (0.231) (0.174) (0.162) (0.162) 
3 (middle) -0.599*** -0.223 -1.239*** -0.133 -0.357 -0.753** -0.238 -0.068 -0.372* 
 (0.216) (0.321) (0.254) (0.286) (0.254) (0.294) (0.246) (0.227) (0.221) 
4(upper) 0.557* -0.311 0.299 -0.054 -0.166 0.173 -0.241 -0.147 -0.166 
 (0.298) (0.379) (0.550) (0.322) (0.311) (0.451) (0.339) (0.302) (0.293) 
Supervisor -0.087 -0.166 0.477** -0.055 -0.682*** -0.194 0.163 -0.073 0.279* 
 (0.153) (0.210) (0.232) (0.181) (0.173) (0.219) (0.185) (0.157) (0.158) 
Constant 1.807*** 3.339*** 1.914*** 0.432 2.213*** 2.517*** -0.296 0.242 0.318 
 (0.419) (0.600) (0.517) (0.480) (0.472) (0.590) (0.495) (0.440) (0.449) 
          
Obs 1175 1235 1253 1174 1181 1176 1037 1046 1050 
𝑅2                       0.094 0.151 0.064 0.038 0.071 0.066 0.023 0.017 0.018 
Notes: This table presents the results of prediction of values based on world values survey (China). It employs a logit model with robust standard errors. The robust t-
statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3b 
Regression of prediction of values (China) 
                          Value 
(active) 
Value 
(creativity) 
Value 
(helping other) 
Value 
(finding faults) 
Value 
(reserved) 
Value 
(life satisfaction) 
Value 
(slack) 
Value 
(nervous) 
Age                       -0.006 -0.033*** -0.046*** 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.011 -0.009 
                          (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Education                       
2(secondary school)              0.234 0.066 0.181 0.098 0.071 -0.050 -0.066 -0.117 
                          (0.182) (0.184) (0.450) (0.192) (0.186) (0.160) (0.273) (0.190) 
3(university)          0.548** 0.729** -0.578 0.020 0.252 0.130 0.203 -0.210 
                          (0.232) (0.284) (0.650) (0.243) (0.238) (0.215) (0.334) (0.248) 
Employment                0.039 0.312 0.250 -0.141 -0.194 0.077 0.364 -0.134 
                          (0.184) (0.200) (0.503) (0.191) (0.189) (0.169) (0.268) (0.195) 
Income                          
2 (middle)               0.099 0.022 0.239 0.055 -0.133 0.090 0.169 -0.039 
                          (0.173) (0.186) (0.577) (0.181) (0.171) (0.152) (0.237) (0.172) 
3 (high)             0.568** -0.028 1.285 0.839*** 0.017 1.261*** -0.017 -0.047 
                          (0.255) (0.283) (1.025) (0.252) (0.246) (0.258) (0.373) (0.258) 
Gender                    -0.044 0.143 -0.348 0.199 -0.513*** -0.136 -0.490** -0.290** 
                          (0.135) (0.152) (0.452) (0.141) (0.134) (0.125) (0.192) (0.141) 
Social class          
2 (working) -0.200 -0.190 0.066 0.014 0.178 -0.270* 0.058 0.088 
                          (0.164) (0.185) (0.564) (0.177) (0.163) (0.148) (0.237) (0.173) 
3 (middle) 0.080 -0.734*** -0.855 0.198 0.307 -0.473** 0.761*** 0.316 
                          (0.232) (0.241) (0.655) (0.238) (0.230) (0.202) (0.292) (0.233) 
4 (upper) 0.389 0.637 -0.829 -0.324 -0.081 0.372 -0.044 -0.683* 
                          (0.298) (0.403) (0.869) (0.298) (0.288) (0.331) (0.471) (0.361) 
Supervisor                0.326** 0.321* 0.638 0.330** -0.206 0.063 -0.197 -0.109 
                          (0.156) (0.190) (0.550) (0.161) (0.157) (0.149) (0.249) (0.169) 
Constant                  -0.323 2.282*** 5.715*** -1.148** 0.299 0.464 -1.738*** -0.018 
                          (0.431) (0.507) (1.108) (0.465) (0.447) (0.399) (0.618) (0.467) 
         
Obs 1001 1181 1180 1025 1005 1249 1058 1025 
𝑅2                       0.034 0.086 0.089 0.024 0.021 0.051 0.028 0.016 
Notes:  This Table presents the results of prediction of values based on world values survey (China). It employs the logit model with robust standard errors. The robust t-
statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.     
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Table 4 
Relation between board value diversity and bank performance 
 Value 
diversity 
(risk) 
Value 
diversity 
(work) 
Value 
diversity 
(prudence) 
Value 
diversity 
(wealth) 
Value 
diversity 
(success) 
Value 
diversity 
(thoroughness) 
Value 
diversity 
(creativity) 
Value diversity 
(helping others) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A:  Dependent variable is ROA 
ROA -0.014 -0.026* -0.030* -0.038* -0.047 -0.012 -0.069 -0.130 
 (-1.654) (-1.742) (-1.984) (-1.864) (-0.974) (-0.346) (-1.491) (-1.564) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
𝑅2 0.282 0.287 0.285 0.293 0.273 0.270 0.281 0.285 
Panel B: Dependent variable is ROE 
ROE -0.297 -0.566* -0.700* -0.825** -1.305 -0.548 -1.680* -2.911* 
 (-1.533) (-1.869) (-1.830) (-2.105) (-1.109) (-0.859) (-1.758) (-1.958) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
𝑅2 0.314 0.321 0.320 0.327 0.307 0.303 0.317 0.320 
Panel C: Dependent variable is Z-score 
Z-score 0.105 0.295 0.579 0.598 1.278 1.984 1.965 4.266 
 (0.135) (0.256) (0.378) (0.417) (0.270) (0.753) (0.570) (0.937) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
𝑅2 0.177 0.177 0.178 0.178 0.177 0.180 0.179 0.180 
Panel D: Dependent variable is NPLratio 
NPLratio 0.064* 0.095 0.030 0.088 0.147 -0.047 0.143 0.397 
 (1.668) (1.549) (0.394) (1.112) (0.610) (-0.322) (0.700) (1.227) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
𝑅2 0.272 0.271 0.260 0.265 0.261 0.259 0.261 0.266 
Notes: This table presents the results of effects of value diversity on bank performance in model (3). Panel A presents results of regressing ROA on various 
value diversities. Panel B presents results of regressing ROE on various value diversities. Panel C presents results of regressing Z-score on various value 
diversities. Panel D presents results of regressing NPLratio on various value diversities.  For the sake of space, the estimation results of control variables are 
omitted in this Table. Year fixed effects are controlled in all regression.  The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Appendix A 
 
Questions from World Values Survey used to identify value indicators: 
 
For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life. Would you say it is : 
V8: work     Very important     Rather important    Not very important    Not at all important 
 
Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each 
description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or 
not at all like you?  
V70. It is important to this person think up new ideas and to be creative; to do things one’s own way.  
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like me  6.Not at all 
like me 
 
V71. It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things. 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like me  6.Not at all 
like me 
 
V74B. It is important for this people to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like me  6.Not at all 
like me 
 
V75. Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one’s achievements. 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like me  6.Not at all 
like me 
 
V76. Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life. 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like me  6.Not at all 
like me 
 
V77. It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would 
say is wrong. 
 
1. Very much like me  2.Like me  3.Somewhat like me  4.A little like me  5.Not like me  6.Not at all 
like me 
 
V160H I see myself as someone who…does a thorough job  
1. Disagree strongly   2.Disagree a little   3. Neither agree nor disagree   4. Agree a little   5.  Agree 
Strongly   6. Don´t know 
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Appendix B 
Variables definition 
Variables Definition 
Panel A: Bank Board Age Diversity  
Age diversity (CV) Coefficient of variation of board age = 𝑠𝑑 
(age)/mean(age) 
Age diversity (SD) Standard deviation of board age 
Age diversity (Blau) Blau index of board age 
Panel B: Directors’ Personal Values  
Value (risk) Probability of thinking taking risk is important 
Value (work) Probability of thinking work is important 
Value (happiness) Probability of being happy 
Value (prudence) Probability of thinking avoiding doing something 
wrong is important 
Value (wealth) Probability of pursuing wealth 
Value (success) Probability of thinking success is important 
Value (thoroughness) Probability of seeing myself as someone who does a 
thorough job 
Value (pressure) Probability of handling press well 
Value (outgoing) Probability of being outgoing/sociable 
Value (active) Probability of having an active imagination 
Value (creativity) Probability of thinking being creative is important 
Value (helping other) Probability of thinking helping others is important 
Value (finding faults) Probability of seeing myself as someone who tends 
to find others’ faults 
Value (reserved) Probability of being reserved 
Value (life satisfaction) Probability of being satisfied with life 
Value (slackness) Probability of being slack 
Value (tension) Probability of getting nervous easily 
Value Diversity (risk) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on risk 
Value Diversity (work) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on work 
Value Diversity (prudence) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on 
prudence 
Value Diversity (wealth) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on wealth 
Value Diversity (success) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on success 
Value Diversity (thoroughness) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on 
thoroughness 
Value Diversity (creativity) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on 
creativity 
Value Diversity (helping others) Coefficient of variation of directors’ value on helping 
others 
Value Level (risk) Mean of directors’ value on risk 
Value Level (work) Mean of directors’ value on work 
Value Level (prudence) Mean of directors’ value on prudence 
Value Level (wealth) Mean of directors’ value on wealth 
Value Level (success) Mean of directors’ value on success 
Value Level (thoroughness) Mean of directors’ value on thoroughness 
Value Level (creativity) Mean of directors’ value on creativity 
Value Level (helping others) Mean of directors’ value on helping others 
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Appendix C1 
System GMM estimations: relation between board age diversity and bank performance. 
 Profitability  Risk 
                          ROA    ROE     Z-score NPLratio 
                          (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Lagged ROA               0.575***     
                          (5.991)     
Age diversity                     -0.016* -0.274*  0.212 0.076 
                          (-1.931) (-1.871)  (0.305) (1.662) 
Independent Director -0.004* -0.067  0.402 -0.011 
                          (-1.684) (-1.570)  (1.360) (-0.834) 
Board Size 0.000 0.001  -0.021** 0.000 
                          (1.271) (0.421)  (-2.081) (0.368) 
Duality                   -0.002 0.007  -0.005 0.002 
                          (-0.687) (0.444)  (-0.045) (0.502) 
State 0.001 0.041  -0.263 -0.005 
                          (0.922) (1.661)  (-1.486) (-0.713) 
Foreign 0.005 0.180  1.259* -0.025 
                          (0.564) (1.369)  (1.665) (-0.641) 
Private -0.001 0.013  0.059 -0.003 
                          (-0.292) (0.392)  (0.265) (-0.271) 
Size                -0.000 -0.001  0.105** 0.003 
                          (-0.283) (-0.156)  (2.318) (1.262) 
Listed                 -0.001 -0.007  -0.098 -0.007 
                          (-0.527) (-0.309)  (-0.977) (-0.904) 
Loan Ratio                   0.001 -0.019  0.003 0.007 
                          (0.299) (-0.501)  (0.008) (0.705) 
Capital Ratio                                  0.030 -0.773**  5.036 -0.001 
                          (1.414) (-2.019)  (1.584) (-0.011) 
City GDP -0.000 -0.001  -0.070 -0.003 
                          (-0.058) (-0.103)  (-1.449) (-0.967) 
Bank Age             -0.000 -0.005  0.025 -0.001 
                          (-0.051) (-0.935)  (0.981) (-0.925) 
Lagged ROE                     0.586***    
                           (6.922)    
Lagged Z-score                        0.798***  
                             (13.944)  
Lagged NPLratio                  0.615*** 
                              (3.540) 
Year Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes   
      
Bank-Year  335 335  333 330 
AR2 p-val 0.877 0.028  0.813 0.310 
Hansen p-val                0.538 0.467  0.598 0.885 
Notes: The table presents the results of the two-step system GMM estimate of regressing bank 
performance (profitability/risk) on board characteristics variables. The left panel presents results of 
bank profitability measured by ROA and ROE. The right panel presents of bank risk measured by Z-
score and NPLratio. Age diversity is measured by the coefficient of variation of board age (CV). AR2 
is test for second order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals under the null of no serial 
correlation. Hansen test statistics is the test of over-identifying restrictions based on the null that 
instruments are valid. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix C2 
Relation between board age diversity and bank performance: robustness test. 
 Profitability    Risk   
                          ROA     ROE     Z-score  NPLratio    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age Diversity -0.000*  -0.005*  -0.001  0.001 
 (-1.966)  (-1.924)  (-0.118)  (1.035) 
Board Size 0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.000 
 (1.298)  (0.648)  (-0.187)  (0.075) 
Duality -0.002*  -0.024  0.086  0.005*** 
 (-1.787)  (-1.306)  (0.947)  (2.780) 
Independent Director 0.005*  0.058  0.248  -0.026** 
 (1.739)  (1.069)  (1.558)  (-2.299) 
State 0.008  0.187  0.094  -0.037 
 (1.401)  (1.646)  (0.288)  (-0.958) 
Foreign 0.001  0.213  -0.351  0.006 
 (0.073)  (1.367)  (-0.902)  (0.159) 
Private -0.008*  -0.067  0.028  0.045 
 (-1.787)  (-0.789)  (0.105)  (1.553) 
Size -0.002  -0.050*  -0.078  0.018* 
 (-1.310)  (-1.981)  (-0.920)  (1.757) 
Listed 0.001  0.015  -0.023  0.001 
 (0.953)  (0.934)  (-0.435)  (0.111) 
Loan Ratio -0.005  -0.084  -0.274  0.035 
 (-1.329)  (-1.174)  (-0.989)  (1.357) 
Capital Ratio 0.014  -0.993***  1.448**  -0.016 
 (0.995)  (-3.990)  (2.029)  (-0.336) 
City GDP -0.001  -0.022  0.008  -0.000 
 (-0.892)  (-0.838)  (0.100)  (-0.079) 
Bank Age              0.000  0.010  0.044  0.009* 
 (0.091)  (0.481)  (0.748)  (1.752) 
Year Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Obs 325  325  325  322 
𝑅2 0.228  0.207  0.154  0.210 
Notes: The table presents the results robustness test of regression in model (1) in which age diversity 
is measured by standard deviation of board age (SD). The left panel presents results of bank 
profitability measured by ROA and ROE. The right panel presents of bank risk measured by Z-score 
and NPLratio. Board Size is the natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality equals 1 if 
bank governor is also chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Independent Director is the percentage 
of independent directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the 
Largest shareholder is government or state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the percentage of shares held 
by the largest shareholders if the Largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage 
of shares held by the largest shareholders if the Largest shareholder is a private investor. Size is the 
natural log of total assets. Bank Age is the natural log of bank age. The dummy Listed equals 1 if the 
bank has been listed at the end of the year and 0 otherwise. City GDP is the natural log of GDP per 
capita of city that the bank’s headquarter is located.It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with 
lagged independent variables. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix C3 
Relation between board age diversity and bank performance: robustness test. 
 Profitability    Risk   
                          ROA     ROE     Z-score  NPLratio    
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age Diversity  -0.006**  -0.069  -0.044  0.009 
                          (-2.194)  (-1.541)  (-0.440)  (1.219) 
Board Size 0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
                          (1.245)  (0.501)  (-0.177)  (0.193) 
Duality                 -0.002*  -0.021  0.088  0.005*** 
                          (-1.700)  (-1.115)  (0.973)  (2.745) 
Independent Director 0.005*  0.053  0.248  -0.025** 
                          (1.834)  (0.974)  (1.591)  (-2.315) 
State 0.008  0.184*  0.088  -0.037 
                          (1.416)  (1.670)  (0.270)  (-0.962) 
Foreign -0.001  0.200  -0.367  0.007 
                          (-0.118)  (1.392)  (-0.946)  (0.206) 
Private -0.009*  -0.068  0.022  0.045 
                          (-1.816)  (-0.786)  (0.083)  (1.559) 
Size -0.002  -0.052*  -0.078  0.018* 
                          (-1.300)  (-1.947)  (-0.921)  (1.727) 
Listed                  0.001  0.020  -0.023  -0.000 
                          (1.479)  (1.411)  (-0.476)  (-0.061) 
Loan Ratio -0.005  -0.076  -0.269  0.034 
                          (-1.150)  (-1.034)  (-0.980)  (1.299) 
Capital Ratio                 0.011  -1.035***  1.435**  -0.010 
                          (0.833)  (-4.157)  (2.047)  (-0.199) 
City GDP -0.001  -0.025  0.008  0.000 
                          (-1.013)  (-0.957)  (0.096)  (0.014) 
Bank Age             0.000  0.012  0.045  0.008* 
                          (0.215)  (0.555)  (0.759)  (1.691) 
Year Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
Obs 325  325  325  322 
𝑅2                       0.249  0.208  0.155  0.209 
Notes: The table presents the results robustness test of regression in model (1) in which age diversity is 
measured by blau index of board age (Blau). The left panel presents result of bank profitability 
measured by ROA and ROE. The right panel presents of bank risk measured by Z-score and NPLratio. 
Board Size is the natural log of board size. The dummy variable Duality equals 1 if bank governor is 
also chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Independent Director is the percentage of independent 
directors. State is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders if the Largest shareholder is 
government or state-owned enterprise. Foreign is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the Largest shareholder is a foreign investor. Private is the percentage of shares held by 
the largest shareholders if the Largest shareholder is a private investor. Size is the natural log of total 
assets. Bank Age is the natural log of bank age. The dummy Listed equals 1 if the bank has been listed 
at the end of the year and 0 otherwise. City GDP is the natural log of GDP per capita of city that the 
bank’s headquarter is located. It employs the panel fixed effect estimator with lagged independent 
variables. The robust t-statistics of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Appendix C4 
Relation between board value diversity and bank performance: robustness test. 
 Value diversity 
(risk) 
Value diversity 
(work) 
Value diversity 
(prudence) 
Value diversity 
(wealth) 
Value diversity 
(success) 
Value diversity 
(thoroughness) 
Value diversity 
(creativity) 
Value diversity 
(helping others) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Panel A:  Dependent variable is ROA 
ROA -0.007 -0.026* -0.029* -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.078* -0.108 
 (-0.892) (-1.716) (-1.752) (-0.880) (-0.270) (-0.311) (-1.670) (-1.665) 
Year Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
𝑅2 0.274 0.287 0.288 0.273 0.270 0.270 0.286 0.283 
Panel B: Dependent variable is ROE 
ROE -0.190 -0.591* -0.687* -0.090 -0.083 -0.370 -1.807* -2.708** 
 (-1.090) (-1.936) (-1.856) (-1.149) (-0.645) (-1.060) (-1.934) (-2.227) 
Year Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
𝑅2 0.275 0.291 0.294 0.270 0.267 0.269 0.290 0.290 
Panel C: Dependent variable is Z-score 
Z-score 0.381 0.541 1.354 0.502* 1.145* 2.954* 1.989 7.422* 
 (0.595) (0.465) (1.193) (1.767) (1.883) (1.886) (0.618) (1.997) 
Year Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
𝑅2 0.179 0.178 0.185 0.186 0.185 0.193 0.179 0.191 
Panel D: Dependent variable is NPLratio 
NPLratio 0.070** 0.098 0.053 0.030 0.055 -0.037 0.168 0.287 
 (2.077) (1.598) (0.788) (1.255) (0.975) (-0.343) (0.870) (0.990) 
Year Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
𝑅2 0.280 0.275 0.271 0.276 0.273 0.270 0.270 0.277 
Notes: This table presents the robustness test results of regression in model (3) in which foreign directors’ value is calculated as half based on directors’ own country 
survey. Panel A presents results of regressing ROA on various value diversities. Panel B presents results of regressing ROE on various value diversities. Panel C presents 
results of regressing Z-score on various value diversities. Panel D presents results of regressing NPLratio on various value diversities.  For the sake of space, the estimation 
results of control variables are omitted in this table.  The robust standard error of each coefficient is shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance level 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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  Appendix C5                  
Robust check: bootstrap regression of value diversity and bank performance 
 Value 
diversity 
(risk) 
Value 
diversity 
(work) 
Value 
diversity 
(prudence) 
Value 
diversity 
(wealth) 
Value 
diversity 
(success) 
Value 
diversity 
(thoroughness) 
Value 
diversity 
(creativity) 
Value diversity 
(helping others) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A:  Dependent variable is ROA 
ROA -0.014 -0.026* -0.030* -0.039* -0.049 -0.011 -0.071 -0.131 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.052) (0.037) (0.048) (0.090) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 
𝑅2 0.282 0.288 0.284 0.293 0.273 0.270 0.281 0.286 
Panel B: Dependent variable is ROE 
ROE -0.298 -0.567* -0.700* -0.826** -1.308 -0.546 -1.683 -2.913* 
 (0.201) (0.319) (0.391) (0.384) (1.225) (0.676) (1.024) (1.533) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 
𝑅2 0.312 0.318 0.318 0.325 0.304 0.300 0.314 0.317 
Panel C: Dependent variable is Z-score 
Z-score 0.089 0.262 0.613 0.581 1.169 2.070 1.868 4.164 
 (0.832) (1.198) (1.602) (1.476) (4.608) (2.889) (3.640) (5.247) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 
𝑅2 0.185 0.185 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.189 0.187 0.189 
Panel D: Dependent variable is NPLratio 
NPLratio 0.064* 0.095 0.031 0.088 0.146 -0.047 0.143 0.397 
 (0.037) (0.062) (0.068) (0.081) (0.241) (0.115) (0.199) (0.31) 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 302 
𝑅2 0.272 0.271 0.260 0.265 0.261 0.259 0.261 0.266 
Notes: This table presents the bootstrap results of effects of value diversity on bank performance in model (3). Panel A presents results of regressing ROA on 
various value diversities. Panel B presents results of regressing ROE on various value diversities. Panel C presents results of regressing Z-score on various 
value diversities. Panel D presents results of regressing NPLratio on various value diversities.  For the sake of space, the estimation results of control 
variables are omitted in this Table. Year fixed effects are controlled in all regression.  The bootstrapped standard error of each coefficient is shown in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
